The Approach: A SharedPlan Analysis of Subdialogues
Evidence for the above claim comes from my recent work on understanding subdialogues in conversation [Loc93] . Following the work of Grosz and Sidner [GSg0] , I view discourse behavior as an instance of the more general phenomenon of collaboration. For agents to successfully collaborate on a task, they must hold certain beliefs and intentions regarding the acts they will perform to accomplish that task. The definitions of the SharedPlan model of collaborative activity [GS90, LGS90, GK93] specify the requisite components of the mental states of collaborating agents and consequently provide an important context for interpreting their utterances. In particular, because agents are aware of the beliefs and intentions they must hold to have a SharedPlan, their utterances can be understood as contributing information towards the establishment of the appropriate mental states, and thus the building of such a plan. The process by which utterances are understood has been formalized in algorithms for augmenting the beliefs and intentions of an evolving SharedPlan, and used to explain utterances concerning the performance of actions [LGSg0, Locgl] .
My current work [Loc93], based on Grosz and Sidner's theory of discourse structure [GS86], provides a new approach to the problem of understanding subdialogues and their relationship to the discourse in which they are embedded. The basic approach entails treating each subdialogue or discourse segment as a separate collaboration between the conversational participants; each utterance of a subdialogue is understood as contributing some information towards the completion of a SharedPlan. Because subdialogues do not occur in isolation, each subdialogue itself is understood in terms of the role its corresponding SharedPlan plays in satisfying the other SharedPlans underlying the dialogue. In particular, if the completion of the new SharedPlan contributes to the establishment of one of the beliefs or intentions necessary for the completion of another, then the first SharedPlan is said to be subsidiary to the second. A subsidiary relationship between SharedPlans corresponds to a dominance relationship [GS86] between discourse segment purposes; it provides an explanation [SI81] for why the dominated segment was initiated by a conversational participant I .
An Example The excerpt in Figure 1 , taken from a larger discourse concerned with the replacement of an air compressor pump by an Expert and an Apprentice [GS86], will be used to illustrate the approach. Because the participants in this discourse are collaborating on the replacement of the pump, the first utterance of this excerpt can be understood as establishing mutual belief that the action described therein, i.e. the removal of the flywheel by the Apprentice, is part of the recipe the agents will use to accomplish their task [LGS90] . Utterance (2), however, begins a new discourse segment, the purpose of which is to bring it about that the Apprentice knows how to perform (i.e. has a recipe for) the act of removing the flywheel. This segment is recognized as a separate collaboration using a conversational default rule for recognizing an agent's desire to collaborate on *I would like to thank Barbara Grosz, Christine Nakatani, and Candy Sidner for their comments on this paper. This research has been supported by U S West Advanced Technologies and by a Bellcore Graduate Fellowship.
1A detailed description of the model can be found in [Loc93] .
the performance of an act [GS90] . The individual utterances of this segment are then understood as directed towards completing a SharedPlan to achieve the purpose of the segment, namely that the Apprentice have a recipe for removing the flywheel. For example, in utterance (3), the Expert's telling the Apprentice the steps in removing the flywheel and an ordering constraint on them (i.e. "First, loosen ..., then pull ...') constitutes a way of achieving that the Apprentice has the requisite recipe. To explain the new discourse segment itself, the Expert must determine how the SharedPlan corresponding to the segment is related to the previous SharedPlan. Because the Expert knows that part of having a SharedPlan is mutually believing that the agent of each act is able to perform that act, the Expert can infer that the Apprentice has engaged in the new SharedPlan in order to bring about an instance of that condition required by the previous or "interrupted" SharedPlan. In particular, because utterance (1) has established that removing the flywheel is part of the recipe for replacing the pump, the Expert can infer that the Apprentice has engaged in the subsidiary SharedPlan to bring about a knowledge precondition [Mor87] required of the dominating SharedPlan to replace the pump.
Discussion
Agents engage in subdialogues for many reasons. For example, they may engage in them based on the need for information to perform actions or to weigh options, the need to correct problems that arise during plan execution, or simply as the result of the normal decomposition of a task. My claim is that all subdialogues can be understood in terms of collaborations between agents, and thus modelled using SharedPlans. The type of plan does not vary with the type of subdialogue, or an agent's reason for engaging in it, only the object of that plan does 2. The same methods used in our previous work to understand utterances concerned with "domain goals" [LA87], can also be used to understand utterances aimed at achieving other types of goals; the only difference is in the object of the recipes and SharedPlans used by the algorithms.
A Rhetorical Relations Approach This approach contrasts sharply with the less goal-directed account of subdialogues given by Litman and Allen [Lit85, LAB7] . In their model, the process of understanding an utterance entails recognizing a discourse plan from the utterance and then relating that discourse plan to some domain plan. While domain plans represent knowledge about a task, discourse plans represent knowledge about relationships between utterances and plans; for example, an agent may use an utterance to introduce, continue, or clarify a plan. Litman and Allen propose their discourse plans as plan-based correlates of rhetorical relations [Lit86, LA87] . Although these plans address some of the problems with computationally based RST [MT87] analyses (i.e. the forrealization and recognition of rhetorical relations), they are extremely rigid in nature and narrow in scope. Each discourse plan (or more specifically the constraints of its decomposition) represents only one specific way in which an utterance can relate to a plan. For example, the only way something can go wrong and be corrected according to the CORRECT-PLAN discourse plan is if a 2By the object of the plan, I mean the act on which the agents are collaborating, i.e. the ot in SharedPlan({Gt, G2 },o~,T1,T2). speaker, not being able to perform the next step in a plan, requests that the hearer do something else first so that he can. In addition, because a new discourse plan is recognized from every utterance, CORRECT-PLAN itself does not model extended problem-solving subdialogues, but only one utterance within such subdialogues. Further utterances of the subdialogue are only understood in terms of their relationship to preceding ones. This approach cannot adequately capture the contribution an utterance of a subdialogue makes to the higher-level purpose of the subdialogue. For example, in the dialogue of Figure 2 , utterances (3)-(4) seem intuitively to comprise a subdialogue the purpose of which is to correct a problem that has occurred during plan execution. Utterance (3) identifies the problem, while utterance (4) suggests a way of fixing it. Under Litman and Allen's analysis, however, utterance (3) is understood as an instance of the CORRECT-PLAN discourse plan (with the utterance, the User is correcting the domain plan to add data to a network), while utterance (4) is understood as an instance of IDENTIFY-PARAMETER. The parameter that utterance (4) is understood to be identifying is one in the CORRECT-PLAN discourse plan, namely the parameter that specifies what new step is being added to a domain plan to correct it. Not only does this analysis run counter to intuitions as to what utterances (3) and (4) both individually and collectively are about, but, as used in a model of plan recognition, it constitutes a claim that the speaker (i.e. User) (i) produces utterances (3) and (4) intending to perform the above CORRECT-PLAN and IDENTIFY-PARAMETER actions respectively, and (ii) intends that the hearer (System) recognize these intentions.
(2 System: 3 User:
System:
User:
Show me the generic concept called "employee".
OK. ~system displays network~ I can't fit a new ie below it.
Can you move it upf Yes. ~system displays network~ OK, now make... The problem with Litman and Allen's approach, like RST-based approaches in general, is that it essentially provides only an utterance-to-utterance based analysis of discourse. In addition to not recognizing discourse segments as separate units with an overall purpose, the model also fails to recognize a subdialogue's relationship to the discourse in which it is embedded. That is, it cannot account for why agents engage in subdialogues. More recent models [LC91, LC92, Ram91] that augment Litman and Allen's two types of plans with other types also suffer from the same shortcomings 3.
Evidence from Generation
Work in generation has recognized a similar problem with respect to RST-based approaches. In particular, Moore gz Paris [MP91] (see also [MP92, Hov93] ) have argued for the need to augment RST-based text plans or schemas [Hov88, McK85] with an intentional structure in order to respond to follow-up questions. The problem is that although solely RST-based approaches associate a communicative goal with each schema, they do not represent the intended effect of each component of the schema, nor the role that each component plays in satisfying the overall communicative goal associated with the schema. Without such information, a system cannot respond effectively if the hearer does not understand or accept its utterances. In response to this problem, Moore and Paris have devised a planner that constructs text plans containing both intentional and rhetorical information. By recording these text plans as part of the dialogue history, their system is able to reason about its previous utterances in interpreting and responding to users' follow-up questions.
Conclusions Both the interpretation process and the generation process need intentionally-based approaches to language. In the former, a solely intentional approach provides a more general 3Analyses of all of these approaches can also be found in [Loc93] . model for understanding subdialogues and their relationships. In the latter, intentional information augments RST information to allow more effective participation in explanation dialogues. Although rhetorical relations have proved useful in machine-baaed natural language generation (see Hovy's recent survey [Hov93] ), their cognitive role rem~ns unclear. Does a speaker actually have them "in mind" when he produces utterances? Or axe they only "compilations" of intentional information that axe computationally efficient for generation systems [MP91]? And if a speaker does have rhetorical relations in mind, does a hearer actually infer them? On that matter, I'd argue, baaed on the above discussion (and following Grosz and Sidner [GS86] ), that a discourse can be understood even if the hearer (be it machine or person) cannot infer, construct, or name any such relations used by the speaker.
